SOME HEW BOOKS.

The Battle of Chickamauga

The great rebellion brought into the serwice of our country experienced soldiers from mearly every part of Europe. Among the best of them was Ivan VASILE VITCH TURCHINION a Colonel of the Russian general staff and Imrial Guard, who had seen service in the Hungarian and Crimean wars.

He entered our army under the name of John Basil Turchin, as Colonel of the Nineteenth Illinois Infantry, and was mustered out at the close of hostilities as a Brigadier-General He distinguished himself throughout the war as a gallant and accomplished officer of radical and aggressive views. He took a conspicuous part in the campaigns of the Army of the Cumberland, especially in the battles of Chickamauga and Chattanooga. He comes before the public again, nearly a quarter of a century after the close of hostilities, as the author of an interesting and valuable volume, entitled Chickamauga (Chicago: The Fergus Printing Company), and we take great pleasure in commending it to the public as together the best and most exhaustive study of that remarkable battle which has yet appeared. It is written in excellent English. free from foreign idioms, in a clear and compact style, and without military technicalities or pedantry. As might naturally have been expected from the education and experience of its author, it con-stitutes a scientific treatise of value to the military student and historian, as well as to the general reader. It is frank and fearthe criticism of men and events. sparing the faults and mistakes of neither high nor low, but from first to last it is measureably free from ill temper and personal prejudice. It tells the truth freely, and in a straightforward and soldierly was which is worthy of the highest praise, and with a conscientious regard for detail, without which such works are valueless. We note only one serious fault in it. and that is an occasional annoying failure to designate roads and posttions laid down on its maps, which are otherwise admirable, by the title given to them in the text, thus making it difficult in several instances for the render not personally familiar with the theatre of war or the battlefield, to get a clear idea of subordinate movements as they are described.

The basis for Gen. Turchin's book is necessarily the official reports of both the Union and Confederate officers, and, so far as we have been able to ascertain, he has correlated and reconciled them with each other with absolute fidelity and fairness. It is proper to add that in doing this he has with becoming modesty added his own observations from the point of view of an actual participant in the events he has undertaken to describe, and it is this fact which gives a special value to his story of the campaign and battle, and to the conclusions and suggestions with which he closes his narrative.

In the preliminary chapter he describes briefly but clearly the situation of the principal Union armies in the Eastern and Western theatres of war, together with the results of the victories of Gettysburg and Vicksburg; and while pointing out the mutual dependence of the armies of the Potomac, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee, he calls attention in the most forcible manner to the practical disregard of that fact by the Executive, and especially by Gen. Halleck, who had been called to Washington as General-in-Chief immediately after the close of the Shiloh campaign.

"That the country should be strategically subdivided into several departments," he says, "was a matter of necessity; but to make these departments independent of each other in a military point of view, as if they were so many foreign countries in which the commander of one had nothing to do with the commander of another, unless ordered by Halleck, was the essence of military | Buckner, who were intrusted with this duty, absurdity. Yet it was done. Grant on the Mis-si-sippl had nothing to do with Rosecrans in Chickamauga, displayed but little celerity or Middle Tennessee, and Burnside in East Ten- resolution, while Walker and Cleburne, who nessee had nothing to do with either Rosecrans or Grant; while Middle Tennessee and Gap to cooperate, falled to make connection Fast Tennessee lay in the same theatre of war. To perceive this does not require any particular knowledge, for by looking at the map any one may see that the armies operating against Chattanooga and Knoxville should cooperate with each other, and should be under the command of one man."

not follow that Halleck was solely responsible. affairs, or to act up to the spirit of their innor is it competent for any one to say just structions. They frittered away the time where the blame should rest, or between when they might have gained a signal vicwhom it should be divided, till the records of whom it should be divided till the records of tory, and finally, after alarming Negley and the War Department and of the President's Baird without doing them any real harm, they office have been examined in respect to this important question. It is known that as early | The fact probably is that they had but little as January of that year Gen. Grant, while on Gen. Halleck urging the unification of the various departments in the Mississippi valley under one commander; but why this was not done at once, instead of deferring it till after the disaster of Chickamanga is not certainly known, and when it is remembered that the control of our military affairs at Washington lay between the President, the Secretary of War, and the General-in-Chief, without any well-defined time of division as to the func- in his own country, he seemed to be always tions of each, the military critic should attribute the fault, for the present, to the system, or the want of system, rather than to any individual, although clothed with the nominal powers of General-in-Chief. Again. Gen. Turchin severely censures Gen. Halleck for issuing peremptory orders on Aug. 5 for the advance of Resecrans's army, and also for failing to reenforce it by troops from Gen. Grant's victorious army at Vicksburz. In this he may be altogether right. although he fails to present the evidence upon which he bases his conclusion. The truth seems to be that the system was again to blame rather than individuals. It is also known that Grant was advised, both before and after the capture of Vicksburg, to send such a portion of his army to rednioree Rosecrans as would he declined at first, on the ground that the country would regard the slightest backward movement until Vicksburg had fallen as equivalent to deleat, and would insist upon his being relieved from command. After his splendid | cover the roads leading into Chattanooga, triumph it is a together probable that he would have willingly gone to Rosecrans's assistance but for Halleck's advocacy of a june on with Banks, and but for Sherman's abortive expedition to Meridian for the capture of Mobile afterward. There is no sort of doubt that the second of these measures faulty both in conception and execution. and that Grant's army was thereby paralyzed for ten weeks, or till the battle of Chickamanga had clearly demonstrated the wisdom of his recommendation for the consolidation of the departments in the Mississippi valley into one great military division, and had set not only the bulk of his own army but two corps of the Army of the Potomae in motion for Chattanooga, which, since the fail of Vicks-

operations. There was another factor not without its influence on the course of events during that year, and that was the lack of perfect confidence, if not of friendly interest, between Grant and Rosecrans, and also between Halleck and Rosecrans, but we can do no more than allude to it here. Gen. Turchin does not treat of it, but confines himself to the more obvious strategic and administrative considerations, in regard to which his views are generally sound; and, what is more, they are expressed in clear and unmistakable language reader can which every He shows that Rosecrans was reluctant to begin the campaign with the troops at his dissal, that he should have been resn'orced before rather than after the battle of Chickamauga, and that it was entirely practicable for the Government to do this. without sacrificing any great advantage in other quarters; but he necessarily leaves the ultimate responsibility for all this undetermined, though it is plain

burg, had become the point of chief stra-

interest in all that vast theatre of

that he regards Gen. Halleck as to plame, and in this it is possible he may be correct.

II. We shall not follow the brilliant though somewhat widespreading operations by which Roseerans moved his army from the neighborhood of Tulishoma, across the Cumberland plateau, the Tennessee Biver, the Sand and Lookout Mountains to the southward of Chattanooga, and thereby compelled the evacnation of that stronghold. The operations were entirely successful, and hence call for no extended criticism. It is now obvious, however, that if Rosserans had paused to colleet his forces and occupy "the gate" which his manceuvres had opened for him, he would have been spared the great disaster which so soon befell him on the slopes of Mission Ridge and the West Chickennauga. Such a pause would have at least given him time to determine the enemy's position and intentions. and to perfect the means of protecting his own communications to the rear before mov

ing on into the heart of the enemy's country. So far as we can learn from the narrative be fore us. Gen. Rosecrans had no comprehensive knowledge at any time of the enemy's movements and no adequate means of procuring it. His maps of the country were poor, but this could not be helped, although it should have made him all the more cautious in his movements after he crossed the Sand Mountain. His system of scouts and all his other means of getting intelligence appear to have been singularly detective, and, as a consequence, he supposed Gen. Bragg, after withdrawing his forces from Chattanooga, had retired to Rome by the railroad and was in full retreat, whereas he had withdrawn his entire army by the highway, and taken up a central position near Lafayette, not more than a good day's march from Chattanooga on the main Southern road. Instead of retreating, he was arranging to fall upon Rosecrans's still widely scattered columns as they debouched from the mountain passes. The fact is that Bragg's attitude was singularly bold and deflant, his temper aggressive, his position admirably chosen, and his plans well laid for directing an overwhelming force upon Rosecrans's isolated corps and destroying them in detail. The advantages of position as well as the lines of operation, were all in his favor; he knew, or should have known, the country thoroughly, and these facts should have given him a preponderance of numbers at every important point of conflict. He had also been advised that the Government at Richmond had resolved to re-nforce him with all the men it could spare from Virginia, as well as from the South west and that Longstreet with his splendid corps, nearly twenty thousand strong, would jota him almost immediately. He had wisely retired from Chattanooga to prevent being isolated and cut off from the South; but he was far from dispirited or demoralized.

At this juncture, the three corps of the Army of the Cumberland, under Crittenden, Thomas, and McCook respectively, were moving southeastward through the mountains by divergent roads and widely separated passes, upon Ringgold through Chattanooga, Lafayette through Stevens's Gap, and Home through Alpine. These extreme points were over sixty miles apart by the travelled roads, so that the right and left would have had to march respectively forty and twenty miles to join the centre corps. while the centre and right must move respectively twenty and sixty miles to join the left. When it is considered that the country was thinly settled and heavily timbered, and that the roads were rough narrow, and crooked, it will be seen that the advantages were greatly in favor of the Confederates, especially if they should strike quickly and heavily at the near-

est Federal corps. Gen. Turchin leaves no room to doubt that Bragg perceived his advantage and made proper arrangements to fall upon Thomas's divisions-which were also badly separatedwith a fair prospect of beating them in detail; but, unfortunately for him, Hindman and in moving from Book Spring up the West were ordered from Lafayette through Dug operations against the Federal columns. Yet these commanders had hitherto shown themselves to be able and aggressive men, and they ought certainly to have understood the opportunity offered upon this occasion; but for some reason not sufficiently explained The essence of all this is obvious, but it does | they utterly failed to discern the situation of with frew to the east side of Pigeon Mountain. confidence in Bragg's generalship, and each his way from Momphis to Vicksburg, wrote to sected on the principle that his first duty was to take care of himself and his command without regard to orders from headquarters. It is possible, too, that the movement of the Union forces on so many different roads, aided by the operations of the cavairy, might have deceived the rebel commanders as to the whereabouts of the mass of the opposing army. Bragg's means of obtaining information were certainly far from good, for, although more or less in the dark, even after he had re-

solved to take the offensive. Having failed to injure Thomas, who had no difficulty in uniting his corps on the slopes of Mission Ridge, between Stevens's and Cooper's Gaps. Bragg now turned his attention in sheer desperation toward Crittenden's corps, which had moved out from Chattanooga and taken position at Lee and Gordon's Mill, a full day's march further down the West Chickamauga; but through a similar fatality, and perhaps through a continued lack of information as to Rosegrans's designs and the actual disposition of his forces. Bragg again failed to strike a vital blow. The practical result of the operations from the 10th to the 15th of Saptember was to check Rosecrans's scattered pursuit of what he thought to be a retreating army, to warn him certainly secure victory to the latter, and that ; that his enemy was not retreating but getting ready to a sume the offensive; and finally, to convince him that if he would avoid a disastrous defeat, he must concentrate his own army in such a position, if possible, as would

A good deal is said in the narrative before us

in praise of the generalship which prevented our forces from being bottled up and captured in McLemore's Cove, but inasmuch as the country, although poorly furnished with roads. was open in all directions, we cannot perceive that the danger of such a dieaster was at any time imprinent. Inasmuch as neither commander was accurately informed of the disposition or streugth of his antagonist, while they were in striking distance of each other from the 9th to the 19th of September without bringing on a general engagement, it is apparent that both were more or less at a loss as to their true policy and plan of operations. They gradually and, as it instinctively drifted northeastwardly down the valley of the Chickennauga, the Federal forces on the west and the Conjederate on the east side of that stream, each without any deflnite knowledge of the other's exact position or provements. They were at times separated by Pigeon Mountain and the West Chickamauga. but, withal, they would have been in plain sight of each other most of the time but for the dense forest which covered the face of the country. The roads were exceedingly dry. however, and the marching columns raised such clouds of dust as to give fair indications of the direction in which the hostlie bodies were moving. The enemy, finding the bridge at Lee and Gordon's mill commanded by Federal guns, continued their march to the northward and crossed the Chickamauga mostly at Reed's Bridge, on the lower Hinggold road; but before they had time to develop their line of battle, they were discovered by the Federal cavalry. and by direction of Thomas were attacked vigorously by Baird and Brannan, supported by Johnson. This caused greater circumspection in the rebel movements, but was

Cleburne. During the 18th of September both armies were marching for position. Thomas and McCook crossed the country from Crawfish Springs to a junction with Crittenden on the main road from Lee and Gordon's mill to Rossville, and all the fighting that evening and the next day took place in the heavily wooded country between that road and the Chicka-manga. It was necessarily desultory and without much method on either side. The Federal army was now united, but somewhat strung out, and from the fact that its line of battle at first coincided in general direction with the road, it is fair to presume that it was taken up by accident and without special consideration of the advantages or disadvantages of the ground, or for any other reason than that it happened to be on the main highway to Chattanooga, All the historians who have described the campaign leave this to be inferred, and the inference is entirely fair.

The Confederate front seems to have been developed without any great regularity, under cover of darkness and the protection of the forest, and, without any high tactical purpose. In-deed, it was formed forward and southwest from Its main crossing of the Chickamauga, with its left resting on that stream, and the whole army in a perilous position, from the fact that its left centre was not more than a mile from the river, while its centre and right were from two to three miles. Had Bosecrans understood the real situation of Bragg's line, and been ready to attack vigorously from his left flank on the 19th, or even the 20th, he might have completely destroyed his antagonist. But he neither understood the enemy's position nor was his own army in condition to assume a vigorous offensive. It had been overworked and badly scattered, and was not sufficiently familiar with its surroundings to strike out boldly and decisively. The battle of the 19th was therefore desultory though bloody. The Union forces held on closely to the road, and gradually closed to the left, while the Confederates brought all their strength to the front, felt the Union lines vehemently from left to right, and while they made but little progress they lost no ground. They showed plainly that they were there to fight a battle, and inasmuch as the policy of concentration had brought together on that field all the available forces of the Confederacy, including Polk from Alabama, Buckner from East Tennessee, and Longstreet with a splendid corns of veterans from Virginia, it was evident that the battle was to be bloody if not conclusive. The operations of the day had convinced the

Union commanders that they would be taxed to their utmost. After posting their troops in line of battle as best they could, and issuing orders to strengthen their position by constructing breastworks and rifle pits, they assembled at Rosecrans's headquarters to consider the situation and receive their orders for the next day. From all accounts it was a serious and so'emn meeting. Sheridan tells us in his memoirs that a feeling of depression seemed to pervade it. Van Horne in the Life of Thomas, says that the latter advised strengthening the left and withdrawing the right to a stronger position, extending about east and west from the south end of Kelly's farm toward Vidito's on the Dry Valley road; but he fails to present the evidence upon which he makes this important statement. The Comte de Paris and Gen. Turchin are silent in regard to it, and the fact remains that the army remained substantially in the position that it occupied on the night of the 19th to fight the battle of the next day. Had the line been formed, as Van Horne says Thomas proposed, and as the disasters of the next day compelled it to be formed, it is altogether likely that it never would have been broken, and that Chickamauga would have been a great national victory. It is certain that it would have covered the roads to Chattanooga much better than the formation that was adopted. Meanwhile Brang, instead of continuing his movement to the left, had resolved to attack from his extreme right, and issued his orders accordingly; but Polk, who had been put in command of his right wing, had remained on the east side of the Chickamauga several miles in the rear, and failed to advance at the early hour expected. In the interval Thomas had called for and received reenforcements and strongthened his line by breastworks and abattis, and when Breekinridge and Cheatham finally advanced about the middle of the forenoon, by a wide detour and a direct attack against his left flank and front, they were repulsed with terrible slaughter. but lailed utterly to shake Thomas's position. Turchin says no more fighting occurred on that part of the field, but the Comte de Parls says a general assault was made all along the line about the middle of the afternoon; but be this as it may, four divisions of the left wing held firm throughout the day.

But the right wing was not so fortunate. Rosecrans himself rode the lines early in the day and discovered, as he thought that the various divisions of the right wing did not form a sufficiently continuous line, and this, together with calls from Thomas that the left wing should be strengthened, caused him to order Negley to the left, and to direct Wood to "close up" on Braunan. It is said that Rose-crans heid McCook mainly responsible for the extended and irregular formation of the right wing, and that while riding the line he directed McCook in person, with marked asperity of manner, to close to the left, and rectify his alignment. Gen. Turchin alleges that Capt. Kellogg of Thomas's staff was the first to call attention to the fact that the line near Brotherton's house was not continuous, that the effort to rectly this was the beginning of the disaster of the day, and that an awkwardly worded order, written and signed by Major Bond of Resecrans's staff, directing Wood "close up" on Reynolds, from whom he was separated by a whole division. completed the blunders which led to such fatal results on that part of the field. If these statements are correct, and there is no apparent reason for doubting them, it is obligatory upon those officers, both of whom are living, to give full explanations of all the circumstances which connect them with what took place. It is to be observed that both were from civil life. and therefore not necessarily up in the details of posting troops or of issuing orders. But to relieve himself from responsibility, Capt. Kellogg should tell whether he made his report on his own motion or under instructions from Gen. Thomas; while Major Bond should state explicitly whether he was left free to word the order to Wood himself, or received and transmitted it rerbatm from Gen. Resecrans. Many efforts have been made to explain and justify the language and purpose of this order. but ther are all more or less futile, for the simple reason that the proper alignment of the army should have been made and verified the night before, late as it was, when the troops had coased fighting and marching. Had this sen done, the order in question could hardly have been thought necessary, for the reserves could have been moved to strongthen any part

of the line. The convequences of the bad formation of the right wing, and of the awkward and unmilitary efforts to rectify it, were ren-dered still more calamitous by the fact that the rebel onset on the left wing had drawn attention away from the advance Longstreet was preparing to make, so that when his veterans made their appearance in front of the Union lines they found everything moving to the left instead of in order to receive an attack. The Union volunteers faced to the right and did their best to stem the tide, but in vain. The whole right wing was swept away like chaff before a storm. Van Cleve. Davis. and Sheridan were driven with but little delay to and beyond the Dry Valley road, along which they fell back in greater or less disorder to McFarland's Gap. two miles and a half from the later battlefield. Here they gathered and reformed from eight to ten thousand men and many guns, and Van Horne tells us that Thomas sent Col. Thruston to them with orders to return and take part in followed that night by a vigorous though | the battle. Col. Thruston, it is said, delivered

unsuccessful advance on the part of the orders, and assured Sheridan, who was the senior General present, that the road was open to Horse-hoe Ridge, on which Brannan, Wood, Stanley, and Le Favour had rallied their troops and reformed their line. Gen. Turchin's statement is less in detail, but in substantial accord with Van Horne's and Col. Thruston's, as well as with that of the Comte de Paris. Sheridan's own version is that he arrived at McFarland's Gap about 11 A. M., and that, after rallying as many men as he could, he rode out to the Dry Valley road, and, finding it occupied by the enemy, resolved to retire to Bosaville and rejoin Thomas by the Lafayette road.

According to Turchin, the enemy under Hindman crossed the Dry Valley road near Vidito's, and, swinging to the right, recrossed it, and took the Union line on Horseshoe Ridge in flank and rear; but he declares that if Sheri-dan had returned with the entire force under his command by the Dry Valley road, or the wagon road leading from James's house to the rear of the Ridge, both of which were practicable, he would not only have annihilated Hindman, but would have given such reinforcement to that part of the Union line as would have insured an overwhelming victory.

IV.

Meanwhile, Brannan, who had also been taken in flank and driven from the first line while trying to close to the left, with the eye of a trained soldier caught sight of Horseshoe Ridge more than a mile in the rear, and sent word to his brigade and regimental commanders to rally and reform their men along its This they did, and thanks to their unshakable courage and the strength of their position, they held their own most gallantly and successfully throughout the day. They were nobly sustained by Wood, Harker, Stanley, and Le Favour. Encouraged by the splendid presence of the imperturba-

ble Thomas, neither the turning movement of Hindman nor the repeated and frenzied attacks of Kershaw, Anderson, and Johnson could drive them from their wellchosen rosition. No writer has hitherto given sufficient praise to the skill and courage of Gen. Brannan, a regular artillery officer of rare merit and modesty, or to the resolution and constancy of Gen. Wood, who may have blundered in obeying the order to "close up." but who never failed, throughout a long career, to do his whole duty as a fighting soldier. Brannan was indisputably the hero of that part of the field, and Gen. Turchin has done a real service to history in bringing this fact to the notice of his countrymen. With such leaders as Thomas, Braunan, Wood, Harker, Vanderveer, Croxton, and Boynton, all soldiers of the highest quality, it is not surprising that the Union line on Horseshoe Ridge, although

heavily outnumbered, was impregnable to the direct assaults of Longstreet's forces. The turning movement, which was directed against its right flank and rear under Hindman, was a much more threatening and dangerous affair, and would have succeeded but for the timely arrival from Ressville of Steedman's division of Granger's reserve corps. This corps consisted of three divisions, only one of which was near enough to the field to reach it in time to be of service, but that one proved to te an invincible host. Hearing the roar of the cannon from the southeast, and conceiving that it grew fainter as the day wore on, Granger and Steedman, with soldierly instinct, without waiting for orders, resolved to march to the front, and when they appeared on the main read, behind the left wing of the army, it was thought best to put them in position to strongthen the centre; but at this time Hindman's movement was about to culminate, and, fortunately, Steedman was directed to that part of the field. He arrived on the extreme right of the Union line in the very nick of time, and, after deploying, he gallantly took the lead, flag in hand, and with a steady but wide-sweeping rush he fell upon Hindman's division and drove it from the field, and thus of the army. Had Sheridan, Van Cieve, Davis, and Wilder been at hand to follow up this master stroke, a complete victory might easily have been gained by the national arms. When it is remembered that in this part of the battle Longstreet still had the preponderance of force, and that the Horseshoe Ridge was at least a mile and a half in rear of the position from which the Union right had been driven in the morning, it will be seen that the quality and conduct of the Union Generals and the gallantry of the Union soldiers must have been superb upon that

memorable occasion. the left extremity of it, was there any connection between him and Heynolds, whose right rested on the Ressville and Lafayette road. The intull half mile, in which there were absolutely no Federal troops at any time after the break in the morning. It is hard y credible that Gen. Turchin's statement as to the interval can be correct, and yet he makes it in the most posttive manner. Van Horne, in the Life of Thomas. says that Wood covered this interval with his skirmishers, while the Comie de Paris, without giving details, says "the line was continuous between Reynolds and Wood."

In view of the fact that Gen. Turchin has visited the field several times since the battle. and that his statement has received the endorsement of Gen. Boynton, himself a participant in the battle, it is altogether probable that it is correct, although official surveys and the final emplacement of the troops upon the map of the battlefield may reduce the interval to a quarter of a mile, and show, besides, that owing to the nature of the ground it was not so important as it seemed to Gen. Turchin. It is a fair inference that, had Longstreet known or even suspected any such situation, he would have directed his bolumns through the interval between Wood and Reynolds, and by falling first upon the le't wing and then upon the right, he could not have failed to rout the whole Union army, and might have destroyed it.

Considering this view of the case, the failure of Sheridan and those with him, to return directly to the line of buttle becomes an unpardonable mistake, while the conduct of Roseerans, McCook, and Crittenden in retiring to Chattanooga, before the issue of the battle was certainly known, can never be justified.

V. From a careful study of Turchin's parrative. the military critic is justified in concluding that. notwithstanding the absence of the army commander, two corps commanders, all of Sheridan's, and parts of Van Cleve's, Davis's, and Negler's divisions of infantry, and Wilder's brigade of mounted infantry, the battlefield should have been held that night; and that it was a serious misfortune that Thomas, upon whom the responsibility was placed, resolved to concentrate by withdrawing to Rossville. This conclusion is further justified by the fact that Sheridan, who had retired from McFarland's Gap to Rossville, had marched out from the latter place to rejoin Thomas on the Latayette road, although it must be said that the latter was most probably ignorant of Sheridan's approach. Be this as it may, Sheridan's line of march brought him toward the fleid in such manner as would have enabled Thomas, had he known it in time, to turn the enemy's right, by a movement from the cross roads at McDannel's house, as Steedman had turned his left by his splendid advance from the rear of Vidito's farm.

It must not be forgotten, however, that thes conclusions are drawn a quarter of a century after the battle, and that many of the facts upon which they rest were not known, and, from the wooded and broken condition of the country, could not possibly have been discovered by any person in either army in time to act intelligently upon them. There was only one military virtue which could have been brought into requisition upon that occasion with any chance of changing the result, and that was obstinacy. Had Thomas been entirely unhampered by instructions, so that he could have said, simply. "This army shall hold this field, and every man within reach

sition to-night," there never could have been any question as to who had gained the victory. As it was, the Confederates claim it, and it must be confessed that while they failed to make it complete, or to gather any adequate fruits from it, the preponderance of advantage was clearly theirs. Gen. Turchin and some other writers, and especially those who are influenced by friendly admiration of Rosecrans, contend that this was a successful battle fought for the possession of Chartanooga, and that it was right to fall back at least to Rossville that night, for fear of Longstreet's advance toward the passes which lead to Chattanooga. But in view of the fact that Chattanooga had been in uninterrupted possession of the national forces for ten days, should it not be frankly admitted that Chickamanca was a drawn battle, which it was not necessary to fight, but which resulted in saving rather than in winning Chattanoga? Besides, it should not be for-gotten that much hard work had jet to be done, that the Brown's Ferry movement had to be planned and carried out, that the combat of Wauhatchie and to be fought that a greater army had to be concentrated and finally that the battle of Mission Ridge had to be woo before Chattanooga and the region in which these events took place could be fairly considered as safely in the possession of the na-

Gon. Turchin's narrative ends with the retirement of the Army of the Comberland into the works at Chattanooga, and the relief of Rosecrans: but he gives us to understand that the plan by which that army was relieved from want and under which it was ultimately led to victory was substantially devised by Rosecrans before he retired from its command. We have sought in vain for proof to support this view. Gen. Turchin does not give it; nor so far as we have yet been able to ascertain, does any one eise. The exact facts and details can hardly be understood till all the reports and despatches relating to the events of the campaign have been published.

Gen. Grant and Gen. Sherman have written upon the subject in their memoirs; Gen. Badeau to the Military History of Gen. Grant has done likewise, and these officers substantially concur in giving the credit for the plans to Gen. Grant. Gen. Thomas, in his official reports and orders, unequivocally assigns to Gen. William Farrar Smith the credit for conceiving as well as for executing the Brown's Ferry movement; while Van Horne, in his Life of Thomas, upon a much fuller statement of the case, not only confirms this view of the matter but leaves little ground to doubt that Smith also conceived the general plan of operations under which the battle of Mission Ridge was fought. Gen. Rosecrans in an article published In the North American Review for December. 1885, avers that he had conceived the plans. and that they would have been carried out as they were if Gen. Grant "had never lived." It has always been understood, however, by those most intimate at Thomas's and Grant's headquarters during the Chattanooga campulga, after Rosecrans had been relieved, that Gen. Smith, who joined after Brang's army had closed in upon Chattanooga, was the first person to foresee and declare to Rosecrans that the national forces could not maintain themselves in Chattanooga, unless direct communication could be opened and maintained with its secondary base at Bridgeport. It has always been understood also that he planned and carried into effect the Brown's Ferry movement, by which communication was opened with Hooker in Lookout valley and thence to Bridgeport, which took place after liosecrans had left; and finally, that Gen. Smith suggested to Gen. Grant the turning movement against Bragg's position on the northern end of Mission Ridge, and that he located the exact place near the mouth of the Chickamauga at which Sherman should cross the Ten nessee River to carry the movement into effect. made good the position held by the right wing | It must be admitted, however, that absolute and irrefragable proof of all this has not yet been presented to the public, but the admission in no way shakes the conclusion that Gen. Turchin claims too much for Gen. Rosecrans when he awards to him the credit of devising the plans carried out by Smith, Thomas, and Grant in the splendid campaign which followed. Gen. Smith's own statement is clear and explicit on the points involved, and leaves no reasonable ground for further discussion.

Gen. Turchin concludes his interesting volume with a spiendid tribute to the intelligence. the courage, and the patriotism of the Ameri-Horseshoe lidge was occupied, with Wood on | campa gu and battle of Chickamanga and by the civil war, well worthy the attention of military students. Many of his conclusions are lowed to sleep at least ten hours. A later resound, but we doubt i! American statesmen terval according to the scale on the map, was a | will suree with him in all, and especially in the opinion that it would be better not to maintain any separate regular army, but to have one formed of the State National Guards.

Many other interesting points and statements are presented by Gen. Turchin, but we defer further reference to them till all the records have been published and the Board of Officers interested has completed the location of the troops at the various epochs of the battle on official map which is to be published under direction of the War Department.

Nursery Hyglene,

Dr. Louis Starn of Philadelphia has published a revised and enlarged edition of a useful household manual called liggiene of the Nursery (Blakiston). This little book does not profess to show how parents may dispense with the services of physicians when their children are iii. Its aim is simply to keep children well. The author has but very little to say about drugs or methods of medical treatment, being aware that years of training and experience are needed for the acquirement of the ability to interpret symptoms and to handie the tools of medicine. But to maintain her in/ant in health should be within the compass of every woman of ordinary brain power who will heed Dr. Starr's suggestions.

Every mother, for example, should be con-versant with certain obvious phenomena which attest the presence of health. The abser disturbance of such phenomena is a danger signal. Thus the face of a healthy in ant wears during sleep an expression of absolute repose. The eyelids are completely closed, the lips are slightly parted, and there is no visible movement of the nostrils. Any variation from this state of things should be heeded with care, if not anxiety. Incomplete closure of the eve lids, rendering the whites of the eyes visib during sleep, is a symptom in all acute and chronic diseases of a severe type. It is also o servable when rest is rendered unsound by pain. Twitching of the eyelids, associated with oscillation of the eyelulis or squint ing, heraids the visit of convulsions A widening of the orifices of the pose with vibratory movements of the nostrile, points to embarrassed breathing from disease of the lungs. Contraction of the brows indicates pain in the head, sharpness of the notrils pain in the chest, and a drawn upper lip pain in the abdomen. All these warnings are derivable from the appearance of the face alone. Other admonitions are conveyed by a infant's defective development. The growth of a child in length and weight ought to gress according to certain definite rules. birth the length varies between sixteen and twenty-two inches, and the weight between six and eight pounds. Length increases most rapidly during the first week of life; afterward the progress is almost uniform up to the lifth month, and then it becomes less rapid, though still uniform until the end of the tweifth month. During the second year the increase is from three to five inches; in the third. from two to three and a half inches; in the fourth, from two to three inches; from this age up to the sixteenth year the average angual gain is from one and two-thirds to two inches. As to weight, there is always a loss during the first three days of life, but by the seventh day the babe should be as heavy as at birth. The

must be brought up and be placed in no- increase is attained during the second being then from four to seven every week. From the first to the month. ounces every week. tenth year there should be a yearly gain of at least four or five pounds, and afterward to the sixteenth year of about eight pounds Parents usually overestimate the weight of children by placing them on the scales when completely dressed. Another test of development is the Increase in the girth of the chest. In the case of an infant weighing seven pounds and measuring nineteen and a balf inches at birth, the chest should be a little more than thirteen inches round. By the fourth month the girth should be increased to fifteen inches; by the ! mentioned the age at which a child sits erect. at which it creeps, walks, or talks. The head third month, and the body maintained in the mouth the infant should sit up with case; by the eighth month it should be able to creep; by the eleventh to walk with assistance; by the fourteenth to walk alone, and by the eighteenth to run. Backwardness in walking may be due to general feebleness, or to paralysis of the muscles of one or both legs. A limping gait, with pain in the knee, suggests disease of the hip joint,

Dr. Starr thinks that the thermometer, if entrely used, is of great value in the nursery. although to overanxious parents it may be a source of much unnecessary alarm. It is indispensable that those who use it should be familiar with the normal range of the body's temperature and with some of the variations in disease. Explicit instructions concerning the methods of using the instrument are given in this book. A temperature between 98° and 99° in the morning and between 97.5° and 98.5° in the evening is the range to be expected in a healthy child beyond the age of five months. Parents are warned by the author of this vol-

ume that the room selected for a day nursery

should have a southwest exposure. The third floor of a house, especially if there be an attic above it, is preferable to the two lower floors. It is drier, more easily heated, less noisy, and ess cut off from sunlight. The night nursery should, if possible, communicate with the day nursery, though this is less important than proximity to the parents' sleeping room. Neither apartment should adjoin a bath room having sewer connections. A lofty celling is far from desirable in a nursery; on the other hand, the room ought not to be less than eight feet high. It is better to use a candle or night light than to burn gas in a night nursery. The room should not be carpeted, and the walls should be painted with a view to being washed and thoroughly disinfected in case of the oc-currence of contagious disease. It is essential to have a separate bed for the nurse and one for each child. We are glad to see that Dr. Starr recommends old-fashioned pitchers and basins instead of stationary washstands. The temperature of the day nursery ought to range between 68" and 70° F.; that of the night nursery from 64" to 63". The best method of heating is by an open fireplace, in which either coal or wood is burnt, care, of course, being taken to provide a high fender that can neither be knocked down nor climbed over by an active child. Such an open fireplace is the best of ventilators. As to the clothing of young children, they should wear long stockings and drawers; they should never be allowed to run about with bare knees. When stockings alone are used, they must be long enough to come well above the knees, and be held in position by "supporters" instead of garters. The shoes even of infants should be carefully made, and should be laced rather than buttoned or held together by elastic fastenings. In regard to the carriage and figure it is useless to try to assist their formation by the aid of braces and corsets. As to the time at which children should be allowed to study. this according to Dr. Starr, should not begin until after the sixth year. Play is the child's business, and the more he does of it the better. In playthings, however, there is limitless room or judicious choice. Against roller skates and bi-yeles the author of this manual sets his face Now as to sleep, bathing, and food. From birth to the end of the sixth or eighth month the infant should sleep as many hours as nature demands. The last feeding should be at 11 P. M. From eight months to the end of two and a half years the child should remain in bed from 7 P. M. to 7 A. M., besides taking a morning pap and occasionally a pap in the Before leaving this portion of the narrative it can volunteer soldier, and it comes with espe- afternoon. From two and a half to four years rise until about twelve hours afterward. After the fourth or fifth year children should be altiring hour than 9 P. M. ought not to be permitted until after the twelfth year. With respect to ablutions, one bath a day should be the rule from birth until the completion of the third year. Water for a child's bath should be soft, and if only hard water is procurable from the ordinary sources of supply, measures must be taken to obtain a provision of rain water. The water should not be cold; 95° F. in winter and from 85° to 92° in summer are the proper temperatures. A hath thermometer should be an inseparable appliance of the bathroom. Unscented castile or giveerine soaps are the best to use. After the third year three full baths a week are quite sufficient. An evening hour is now to be preferred, but the same temperatures should be preserved. The child should, in addition, be onged every day. As the child approaches puberty he should be encouraged to form the habit of buthing every day. At this period water may be used as it flows from the faucet, provided the bathroom is warm. Not more than fifteen minutes should ever be occupied in the whole process of bathing and drying.

Touching the nourishment of infants, Dr. Starradmits that there is no artificial food equal to the milk of a robust woman. But thoroughly healthful and trustworthy wet nurses are so hard to find, and the author has n his own practice met with such good results from carefully managed bottle feeding, that he prefers to regulate the child's nourishment himself by recourse to the latter expedient rather than allow an ignorant woman to privily supplement her delicient supply of breast milk by an unskilfully proportioned food-a proceeding. it seems, of no uncommon occurrence. Asses' milk resembles that of women a little more closely than does that of the cow, goat, or ewe. It is, Dr. Starr says, a mistake to suppose that condensed milk is more readily digested than cous' milk. The counter impresen has become correct, because condensed milk is always dissolved in a large proportion of water, whereas cows' milk is too often inafficiently diluted. I arinaccous food, as such, s never permissing below the fourth month. except where it is employed solely for its mechanical action.

The inst chapter of this useful little book is entitled "Emergencies," and tells the parent or nurse what to do in the case of an accident or sudden disolder, where the services of a physician are not immediately procurable.

Toleration. Dr. Phillip Schaff, whose " History of the Carlstinu Churen" and "Creeks of Christenou " are, or should be, familiar to distudents of religiou, has to rinted an interesting ossay. first published in the papers of the American Society of Church History. The easny, which in its present enlarged form is entitled The Progress of Religious Freedom (Scribners), pre-sents a chapter of church history, which although of obvious importance, has nowhere else received adequate attention. In the several sections of his treatise, the authord scusses the history of toleration and its con verse, intolerance, in the Roman Empire. is medieval and modern Italy, in termina France, and England, and in the United State In the appendix are counted in (aif success) making documents as the togration hater of Constantine the Great, the Edict of Nantes. issued by Henri IV., the Edict of Revocation by Louis XIV., the Edict of Potsdam, and the Act period of most rapid; gain in weight is during Louis XIV., the Edict of Potsdam, and the Act the first five months of life. The maximum of a di Toleration passed under William and Mary.

to which is added the constitutional provision for religious liberty in this country. Doctor Schaff begins by pointing out, first, that there is a wide difference between tolera tion and liberty, the one being a concession, the other a right, and, secondly, that toleration may proceed from necessity, from prudence, from indifference, from liberality, or from an enlarged view of truth and right. It is in the United States that the principle of ligious liberty has been most firmly embedded in organic law. The several varieties of toleration are exemplified in the history of Europe. and carefully distinguished in this essay. It is a curious fact that the Emperor Gal-

twelfth munth to alout seventeen; by the fifth | erius, who was the real author of the peryear to twenty-one inches. Among other secution of the Christians under Diocletian, phenomena which deserve attention may be acknowledged the failure of the attempt to exterminate the new religion, and issued an edict permitting the Christians to hold their assemblies, merely directing them to pray to their God for the welfare of the Emperor and sitting posture a month later. By the sixth | their State. The effect of this extraordinary departure from the policy of preceding Casars is fully recognized by Dr. Schaff. There is no doubt that it stopped persecution, and prepared the way for the change under Constantine and his successor from reluctant teleration to friendly neutrality and official protection. The remarkable feature of the Edict of Constantine is its acknowledgment of the right inherent in every man to choose his religion and mode of worship according to the dictates of his own conscience. From the moment, however, that the Roman Emperors, ceased to be the Pontifex Maximus of igo atry, and assumed the authority of Severeign Bishop over the external affairs of the Catholic Church. Christian intolerance took the place of heathen intolerance. It is significant that heresy was persecuted before the heathen temples were disturbed. Such, in the state of public opinion at the time and for many centuries afterward, was the inevitable consequence of the union of Church and State. The penal legislation against heresy, begun by Theodosius the Great and completed by Justinian, passed into the legislation of the German empire and other States of Europe.

It is nevertheless true that after the downfall of Arianism there was but little persecution in western Europe up to the date of the crusade against the Albigenses. The position then assumed, or rather emphasized, by the Papacy, is maintained, in theory at least, to this day. Thus in 1832, Gregory XVL condemned religious teleration as "the most fruitful cause of evils with which the Church is at present afflicted;" in 1864, Pius IX, denounced as erroneous the proposition that the Church ought to be separated from the State; finally, in 1885, an encyclical of Leo XIIL, although a singularly moderate and prudent document, declares it to be " a crime for private individuals or States to treat different kinds of religion

in the same way." During the last forty years the principle of teleration has rapidly gained ground in Italy. As early as 1848 the King of Sardinia gave, by a fundamental law, permission to the Waldenses, and other Christian denominations, to worship according to their own ideas: since 1870, the same toleration has been extended through the whole kingdom of Italy. Such Italian statesmen as Cavour and Minghetti have advocated the theory of a free church in a free State. In Germany, down to the end of the seventeenth century, the prevailing sentiment among Protestants as well as Catholics condemned toleration as a compromise with error, and as a dangerous heresy. Melancthon, as well as Luther and Calvin, considered persecution fully justified. After the peace of Augsberg, the theory of the inseparability of Church and State in corollary of which is intolerance) was embodied in the maxim cujus regio ejus religio, cr. in other words, a subject's religion must be the same as his ruler's. The chief difference between the peace of Augsburg and the arrangement effected nearly a century later at Westphalia was that, whereas by the former toleration was confined to Lutherans, the latter extended it to the so-called Reformed or Calvinists. The maxim cujus regio ejus religio was nevertheless maintained. The Great Elector of Brandenburg went in 1686 a step further by permitting religious differences within his own dominions. He granted hospitality and religious freedom to 20,000 Huguenot refugees, who brought with them a Confession of their own. Frederick the Great car-ried out the same liberal principles on a much wider scale. He gave freedom of worship to the Mennonites, Socinians, and Moravians, and even to the Jesuits in Silesia after the latis proper to call attention to the statement ciai grace from the pen of an officer educated a child may or may not take an hour's sleep ter had been expelled from other European made by Gen. Turchin that at no time after the in the fixed military system of Bussia. He also in the morning, but it should invariably be States. The Prussian Constitution of 1850 guaranteed freedom of private and publiworship, the right of religious association, and the enjoyment of civil and political rights irrespective of religious views. A remarkable exhibition of liberality, considering the part taken by Austria in the Thirty Years War, was

the edict issued in 1781 by Joseph II. authoriz-

ing Lutherans and Calvinists to hold public

worship in his hereditary possessions. We

may add that the doctrine of religious liberty

is affirmed in the fundamental laws of the new

In Germany toleration was a mutual conces-

sion on the part of Roman Catholic and Protes-

German empire.

tant sovereigns: in France it was the free grant of a Roman Catholic King (Henry IV.) to his Protestant subjects. The Edict of Nantes, issued in 1598, guaranteed to the French Calvinists a legal status. The number of Calvinistic congregations at the time was over 750, and, according to a statement, which, however, Dr. Schaff does not deem sufficietly authenticated, there were then 1.250,000 Protestants in France. It is sometimes overlooked that this edict was four times confirmed by four of Henry's successors, including Louis XIV... who subsequently, in 1685, revoked it. At the lat ter date France contained about a million and a balf of Protestants, the aggregate population being twenty millions. Dr. Schaff estimates the number of Huguenots who, during the reign of Louis XIV., preferred to emigrate rather than give up their faith, at half a million. It is an interesting reminiscence that, in the battle of the Boyne, a company of Huguenot exiles were the first to cross the river. Three of the seven Presidents of the Continental Congress, viz. Laurens. Jay, and Boudinot, were of Huguenot descent. It was just about a hundred years after the Edict of Revocation that Louis XVL returned to the tolerant policy of Henry IV. In 1787 he signed an edict conceding civil rights to those of his subjects who did not profess the Roman Catholic religion. The Constituent Convention of 1789 made Protestants eligible to all public offices, and the Republican Constitution of 1793 proclaimed the free exercise of religion to be an indefeasible right. Napoleon L. although he concluded a concordat with the Pope, upheld the legal existence of the Protestant churches. The Napoleonic system, so far as it affected religion, has remained substan-tially intact to this day. Even the present republic, however, does not allow the Reform Church to exercise the right of synodical church government. In this respect the existing law is less liberal than the Edict of Nantes, which authorized provincial and general synods. The English teleration act, passed under

William and Mary, was narrower in its application than the treaty of Westphalia, for it expressly debarred the Romanists and Socialians on profiting by its prohibitions. It was not until 1812 that the Sociations or Unitarians secured toleration, and Catholic emancipation was deterred until 1829. The legal disabilities of the Jews were removed in 1858, and since the outcome of the Bradlaugh case it seems to be settled that even professed atheists possess all the civil rights of Englishmen. M. W. H.

A Series of Events at Oppenheimer's,

From the Gladstone lieita. Henry Oppenheimer, our gental black-mith, was at work in the shop shoeing a horse attached, and his wife left the nouse to shoe as home, deaving his little son Courad atone with Nebuchad erzar. Asbachainezar got his head in the milk altelier and was unable to extreate it; control was compelled to cut the head off to save the pither, and then he left obliged to break the pitcher to get the head out. Henry Opienheimer nearly lost his con Conrad. It was a close call for him when his ma came into the kitchen.